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Tamara	Jugov	and	Lea	Ypi	
Structural	Injustice,	Epistemic	Opacity	and	the	
Responsibilities	of	the	Oppressed1	
 
 
																																									(Journal	of	Social	Philosophy,	forthcoming)	
I.	Introduction	
	
Consider	 statements	 of	 the	 kind:	 "Citizens	 of	 poor	 countries	 are	 often	 plagued	 by	
corruption".	"People	who	do	not	come	from	white	middle	class	backgrounds	tend	to	have	
less	access	to	higher	education	opportunities".	"Women	in	philosophy	are	disadvantaged	
compared	to	their	male	colleagues".	Common	to	all	these	statements	is	the	emphasis	on	
how	membership	in	particular	groups	renders	members	of	those	groups	vulnerable	to	a	
particular	form	of	disadvantage,	one	that	is	recursively	implicated	in	a	system	of	rules	
that	persistently	disempowers	them.	Call	this	form	of	disadvantage:	structural	injustice.	
And	 call	 the	 agents	 who	 are	 persistently	 subject	 to	 structural	 injustice:	 structurally	
oppressed	agents.	
The	aim	of	 this	paper	 is	 to	examine	 the	 responsibilities	of	oppressed	agents	 in	
circumstances	of	structural	injustice.	It	is	not	to	explain	what	structural	injustice	is	and	
why	it	matters:	we	will	assume	that	readers	interested	in	the	topic	already	have	some	
answers	to	these	questions.	The	point	is	also	not	to	illustrate	the	baseline	with	regard	to	
which	we	can	detect	structural	disempowerment:	e.g.	with	regard	to	lack	of	resources,	
opportunities,	harm	to	interests	or	access	to	particular	social	roles.	We	begin	with	the	
intuition	 that	 the	 wrong	 of	 structural	 injustice	 consists	 in	 disempowering	 particular	
groups	 with	 reference	 to	 some	 baseline	 and	 turn	 to	 a	 different	 issue:	 that	 of	 the	
obligations	of	members	of	such	groups	to	remedy	structural	injustice.	We	suggest	that	
responsibilities	 to	 remedy	 structural	 injustice	 come	 in	 degrees	 and	 that	 they	 differ	
depending	on	agents’	degree	of	epistemic	awareness	concerning	structural	injustice.	
                                                             
1		
We	are	very	grateful	to	John	Christman,	Rainer	Forst	and	two	anonoymous	reviewers	of	the	journal	for	
excellent	written	comments	on	previous	versions	of	this	paper.	
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The	 paper	 proceeds	 as	 follows.	 In	 section	 II	 we	 offer	 some	 definitions	 and	
preliminary	 clarifications.	 In	 section	 III,	 we	 introduce	 a	 particular	 kind	 of	 injustice	
relevant	 to	 our	 paper:	 epistemic	 injustice	 and	we	 discuss	 its	 relation	 to	what	we	 call	
epistemic	opacity.	We	suggest	that	epistemic	opacity	shapes	agents'	awareness	of	their	
oppression	 within	 a	 structure	 and	 should	 be	 taken	 into	 account	 when	 ascribing	
responsibilities.	 This	 can	 be	 done,	 by	 distinguishing	 between	 different	 degrees	 of	
awareness	 concerning	 structural	 injustice	 and	 by	 distributing	 responsibilities	 that	
correspond	 to	 these	 different	 degrees	 of	 awareness.	 In	 section	 IV	we	 begin	with	 the	
simple	case	of	those	who	are	oppressed	by	a	structure	and	epistemically	aware	of	their	
oppression.	We	 continue	 in	 section	V	with	 the	more	 complex	 case	 of	 agents	who	 are	
oppressed	 by	 a	 structure	 but	 unaware	 of	 that	 oppression,	 what	 we	 call	 agents	 in	 a	
condition	of	epistemic	opacity.	There	are	different	forms	and	degrees	of	epistemic	opacity. 
In	some	cases,	agents	might	know	that	they	suffer	some	wrong	but	doubt	the	fact	that	
what	they	suffer	from	can	be	defined	as	injustice.	In	others,	they	might	be	aware	that	they	
suffer	from	an	injustice	but	remain	sceptical	that	the	injustice	is	structural.	In	section	VI	
we	 discuss	 a	 different	 case	 of	 epistemic	 opacity:	 agents	 who	 believe	 that	 although	
structural	 injustice	exists,	 they	are	exceptional	 in	not	being	affected	by	 it	 individually.	
Section	VII	discusses	objections.	Section	VIII	concludes.	
	
	
II.	Definitions	and	clarifications			
	
Structural	injustice	is	a	distinctive	kind	of	injustice.		Broadly	speaking,	a	social	structure	
can	be	understood	as	a	system	of	rules	(both	formal	and	informal)	responsible	for	the	
relative	power-positions	and	the	distribution	of	 resources	among	 the	different	agents	
complying	with	such	rules.2	A	social	structure	can	be	said	to	be	unjust	when	the	rules	
perpetuated	 through	 it	 persistently	 disadvantage	 some	 social	 groups	 vis-à-vis	 others.	
Whatever	baseline	is	chosen	to	help	identify	structural	injustice,	if	the	injustice	is	to	count	
as	structural	and	not	merely	a	result	of	unfair	or	unequal	distribution,	it	must	express	
some	 more	 persistent	 or	 deeper	 power-differential	 between	 social	 groups.	 One	
                                                             
2	For	example,	Sally	Haslanger,	Resisting	Reality:	Social	Construction	and	Social	Critique	(Oxford:	Oxford	
University	Press,	2012),	p.	311	ff.	
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particularly	salient	 feature	of	structural	 injustice	 lies	 in	 the	 fact	 that	systems	of	social	
rules	seem	to	be	self-perpetuating.	For	example,	social	rules	might	have	been	created	by	
agents	who	no	 longer	exist	or	 they	might	have	emerged	as	a	result	of	 the	unintended	
consequence	of	certain	patterned	social	interactions.	They	might	continue	to	be	endorsed	
either	 through	negligence	or	 failure	 to	 correct	 them.	Or	 they	might	persist	because	of	
powerful	 social	 narratives	 upholding	 them	 or	 because	 they	 benefit	 agents	 who	 have	
become	impervious	to	the	oppression	of	others	but	continue	to	occupy	the	key	offices	and	
positions	that	allow	such	rules	to	be	replicated.		
Given	 the	 pervasive	 effects	 of	 structural	 injustice,	 everyone	 implicated	 in	 the	
generation,	maintenance	or	reproduction	of	a	system	of	social	rules	has	responsibilities	
with	regard	to	 its	unjust	effects.	By	acting	within	a	particular	structure	agents	cannot	
avoid	contributing	both	to	the	distribution	of	resources	as	well	as	to	the	generation	of	
social	rules	 that	 the	 structure	 replicates.	Thus,	 even	 if	 the	way	 such	distributions	and	
social	rules	come	about	 is	 independent	of	 the	will	and/or	 intentions	of	any	particular	
agent,	 such	 agents	 can	 nevertheless	 be	 attributed	 political	 responsibilities	 for	 the	
structural	 upshots	 of	 their	 actions.	 The	 term	 ‘political’	 is	 important	 here.	 Indeed,	 the	
model	of	responsibility	at	work	in	this	paper	is	of	a	‘political’,	as	distinctive	from	a	merely	
moral	responsibility.	As	several	 authors	have	argued,	political	 responsibility	need	not	
rest	 on	 the	 usual	 criteria	 for	 the	 assignment	 of	 causal	moral	 responsibility,	 such	 as	
intentionality,	 foreseeability	and	 ability	 to	have	done	otherwise.3	Although	we	cannot	
argue	 the	 point	 further	 here,	 in	 the	 paper	 we	 start	 with	 the	 assumption	 that	 those	
oppressed	 by	 structural	 injustice	 have	 political	 responsibilities	 with	 regard	 to	 its	
remedy.4 	
Notice	 that	 social	 rules	 need	 not	 be	 coercively	 enforced	 in	 order	 to	 reproduce	
structural	 injustice:	 the	endurance	of	certain	conventions	and	the	way	they	 frame	the	
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 One	 very	 forceful	 position	 arguing	 for	 the	 existence	 of	 victims’	 political	 responsibilities	 to	 remedy	
structural	 injustice	 is	presented	by	 Iris	Marion	Young,	see	her	Global	 Justice	and	Political	Responsibility	
(Oxford:	 Oxford	 University	 Press,	 2011).	 Author	 A	 has	 argued	 for	 a	 power-based	 political	 model	 of	
responsibility	with	regard	to	structural	injustice	at	greater	length	in	her	XXX.  
4	In	focusing	on	questions	of	structural	injustice	and	oppression,	we	do	not	deny	that	individual	or	group	
agents	might	also	oppress	others	in	a	more	direct	fashion.	As	Sally	Haslanger	has	put	it:	“...oppression	is	
something	that	both	agents	and	structures	“do,”	but	in	different	ways.	Structures	cause	injustice	through	
the	misallocation	of	power;	agents	cause	wrongful	harm	through	the	abuse	of	power	(sometimes	the	abuse	
of	 misallocated	 power).“	 (Haslanger,	 Resisting	 Reality	 at	 p.	 320).	 The	way	 in	which	 individual	 agents	
oppress	other	agents	by	misusing	the	power	(wrongfully)	allocated	to	them,	is	doubtlessly	an	important	
question,	but	also	not	one	we	tackle	in	this	paper.	For	an	influential	account	of	interpersonal	domination,	
see	Philip	Pettit,	Republicanism	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1997).		
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beliefs	of	 those	who	endorse	them	might	be	enough	to	 incentivise	certain	actions	and	
constrain	 others.	 All	 this	 is	 important	 because,	 as	 we	 shall	 see	 in	 what	 follows,	 the	
distinctiveness	 of	 structural	 injustice,	 and	 the	 way	 in	 which	 injustice	 is	 replicated,	
renders	agents	operating	within	such	structure	vulnerable	to	epistemic	opacity	(some	
might	also	call	this	ideological	distortion)	when	it	comes	to	observing	the	persistence	of	
injustice.	This	problem	affects	both	those	who	benefit	(even	if	unintentionally)	from	the	
way	 in	 which	 structures	 operate	 and	 those	 who	 are	 negatively	 affected	 by	 them,	
complicating	the	task	of	reflecting	on	the	complicity	and	responsibilities	of	each.	
	 While	the	problems	of	ideological	distortion	and	false	consciousness	are	not	new,	
discussions	 in	 the	 recent	 literature	 have	 mainly	 focused	 on	 the	 responsibilities	 of	
perpetrators	or	beneficiaries	of	structural	injustice	rather	than	on	the	responsibilities	of	
the	oppressed.5	Even	in	the	few	cases	where	attention	has	turned	to	the	latter	and	the	
responsibilities	of	the	oppressed	have	been	analysed	in	terms	of	resistance	to	oppression,	
the	discussion	has	mainly	 focused	on	 the	 reasons	 for	which	 such	 resistance	might	be	
justified. 6 	Following	 Iris	 Marion	 Young	 and	 the	 model	 of	 political	 responsibility	
mentioned	 above	 we	 will	 assume	 that	 the	 victims	 of	 structural	 injustice	 have	 some	
responsibilities	to	engage	in	activities	“directed	at	transforming	those	structures”.7	But	
as	 Young	 has	 emphasised8 	it	 is	 important	 to	 complement	 this	 discussion	 with	 more	
attention	to	the	content	of	victims’	responsibilities.		
There	are	of	course	many	considerations	to	take	into	account	when	establishing	
the	 exact	 content	 of	 those	 responsibilities.	 In	 this	 paper,	 we	 focus	 on	 their	
correspondence	to	the	degree	of	epistemic	awareness	victims	have	of	the	injustice	they	
suffer.	Reflecting	on	the	responsibilities	of	the	oppressed	in	proportion	to	their	degree	of	
epistemic	awareness	of	structural	injustice	seems	like	a	much-needed	component	in	any	
comprehensive	account	of	the	responsibilities	of	the	oppressed.	However,	this	demand	
                                                             
5	Cf.	Thomas	Pogge,	World	Poverty	and	Human	Rights,	(Verso:	London,	2002);	Daniel	Butt,	“On	Benefitting	
from	 Injustice”,	Canadian	 Journal	of	Philosophy,	37,	1	 (2007):	129-152;	Robert	E.	Goodin	and	Christian	
Barry,	“On	Benefitting	from	the	Wrongdoing	of	Others”,	Journal	of	Applied	Philosophy,	31,	4	(2014):	363-
376.	
6 	Cf.	 Ann	 E.	 Cudd,	 Analysing	 Oppression	 (Oxford:	 Oxford	 University	 Press,	 2006),	 Daniel	 Silvermint,	
“Resistance	 and	Well-Being”,	The	 Journal	 of	 Political	 Philosophy21,	 4	 (2013):405–425;	 Carol	Hay,	 “The	
Obligation	 to	Resist	Oppression”,	Journal	of	Social	Philosophy,	42,	1	 (2011):21–45;	Bernard	Boxill,	 “The	
Responsibility	of	the	Oppressed	to	Resist	Their	Own	Oppression",	Journal	of	Social	Philosophy,	41,	1	(2010):	
1–12.	
7	Iris	Marion	Young,	Global	Justice	and	Political	Responsibility	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2011),	at	p.	
113.	
8
 Cf.	Young,	2011:	144	ff.  
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faces	an	obvious	challenge.	The	challenge	is	to	trace	an	account	of	the	responsibilities	of	
the	oppressed	which	is	substantive	enough	to	be	able	to	say	something	about	how	even	
those	 who	 are	 in	 a	 condition	 of	 epistemic	 opacity	 can	 contribute	 in	 some	 way	 to	
remedying	 structural	 injustice,	 and	 nuanced	 enough	 to	 explain	 what	 form	 their	
contribution	 must	 take	 given	 the	 problems	 of	 epistemic	 injustice,	 complicity	 and	
cooptation	characteristic	of	such	circumstances.	
This	approach	is	of	course	not	without	problems.	One	might	worry	for	example	
that	our	focus	on	the	responsibilities	of	the	oppressed	runs	the	risk	of	'blaming	the	victim'	
where	 beneficiaries	 or	 perpetrators	 should	 instead	 be	 the	 main	 focus	 of	 attention.	
Another	worry	might	be	that	 to	place	so	much	emphasis	on	the	responsibilities	of	 the	
oppressed	contributes	to	increase	feelings	of	shame	and	self-resentment	on	the	side	of	
already	vulnerable	agents	who	might	 lack	 the	will,	 resources	and	opportunities	 (both	
material	and	symbolic)	to	speak	up	for	themselves.9	Although	it	is	important	to	remain	
aware	of	these	problems	(and	we	will	return	to	them	later),	it	is	also	important	not	to	
victimize	 the	 oppressed	 even	 further	 by	 obscuring	 their	 (perhaps	 limited)	 forms	 of	
agency.	 The	 trade-off	 between	 taking	 seriously	 the	 agency	 of	 victims	 and	 showing	
sensitivity	 to	 the	circumstances	of	 their	oppression	might	be	tackled	by	 introducing	a	
more	nuanced	account	of	the	responsibilities	of	the	oppressed,	as	we	propose	in	what	
follows.	By	paying	attention	to	agents’	degree	of	epistemic	awareness	about	their	own	
oppression,	such	an	approach	sits	in	between	the	strong	claims	of	those	who	insist	on	the	
political	agency	of	the	oppressed	to	change	their	condition	and	the	weaker	position	of	
those	who	emphasise	the	limitations	that	structural	constraints	place	on	that	agency.	
	 Finally,	one	last	clarification	is	in	order.	We	defined	structural	injustice	in	terms	
of	an	injustice	replicated	by	a	system	of	rules	that	persistently	disempowers	members	of	
particular	social	groups.	Such	a	definition	of	structural	injustice	along	the	parameter	of	
groups	 and	 not	 individuals	 is	 widely	 accepted	 in	 the	 literature. 10 	However	 our	
understanding	of	what	counts	as	a	structurally	oppressed	group	is	not	an	ontological	one.	
A	social	group	cannot	be	defined	pre-politically	and	 it	 is	never	only	 constituted	by	the	
objective,	 intrinsic	or	essential	 traits	 it	possesses	 such	as	 the	 colour	of	 the	 skin	of	 its	
                                                             
9	Marilyn	Frye,	"History	and	responsibility",	Hypatia,	8,	3	(1985):	215–6.	
10	For	definitions	of	structural	injustice	along	group-parameters	see	Haslanger,	Resisting	Reality,	p.	312;	Iris	
Marion	Young,	Justice	and	Politics	of	Difference	(Princeton,	New	Jersey:	Princeton	University	Press,	1990),	
p.	42	 ff;	Hay,	"The	Obligation	 to	Resist	Oppression"	p.	41,	Marilyn	Frye,	 “Oppression”	 in	The	Politics	of	
Reality	(Trumansburg,	NY:	Crossing	1983),	p.	11;	Ann	E.	Cudd,	Analyzing	Oppression	p.	118.	
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members	or	the	nature	of	their	character.	Instead,	social	groups	should	be	understood	as	
generic	 social	 constructions	 or	 artefacts,	 which	 are	 also	 the	 intended	 or	 unintended	
product	of	the	application	of	specific	social	rules.11	Such	social	rules	and	the	classificatory	
schemes	they	produce	tend	to	be	“normativised”:	they	do	not	simply	map	social	realities,	
but	also	contain	functional	and	prescriptive	aims.12	Hence	social	groups	cannot	be	said	to	
precede	 structural	 injustice	 in	 any	 interesting	 or	 meaningful	 way:	 they	 are	 also	
constituted	by	social	rules	and	practices,	often	structurally	unjust	ones.	
	
III.	Oppression	and	structural	injustice:	the	need	for	epistemic	differentiation	
	
How	exactly	do	social	rules	oppress	certain	groups?	One	way	to	answer	this	question	is	
by	focusing	on	the	negative	effects	social	rules	persistently	generate	for	members	of	such	
groups,	for	example	by	considering	the	amount	of	resources	comparatively	available	to	
them,	 their	 access	 to	 offices	 and	 social	 positions,	 their	 opportunities	 for	 further	
development	and	so	on.	This	in	turn	points	to	the	degree	of	power	controlled	by	members	
of	 oppressed	 groups	 and	 to	 the	 use	 of	 such	 power	 to	 scrutinise,	 question	 and	 amend	
dominant	social	rules.13	In	this	paper	we	want	to	focus	on	one	important	subset	of	this	
latter	category	of	questions:	the	way	in	which	social	rules	affect	awareness	of	injustice	
and	their	implications	for	the	responsibilities	of	the	oppressed.	
	 It	 has	 often	 been	 noticed	 that	 structurally	 unjust	 systems	 of	 rules	 distort	 the	
beliefs,	norms	and	conventions	that	help	shape	the	cognitive	systems	of	those	embedded	
in	such	structures.	This	connects	to	one	way	in	which	the	concept	of	epistemic	injustice	
                                                             
11	Cf.	Haslanger,	Resisting	Reality,	ch.	2.	
12	Ibid.	pp.	99-100.	Related	social	constructivist	notions	of	“social	group”	can	be	found	in	most	feminist	
works	 focusing	 on	 oppression.	 For	example,	Nancy	 Fraser	 argues	 that	 it	 is	 not	 an	essentialising	 group	
“identity”	which	requires	recognition	but	the	status	of	 individual	group	members	regarding	their	social	
standing	vis-à-vis	others	(Nancy	Fraser,	"Rethinking	Recognition",	New	Left	Review,	vol.	3	(2000),	pp.	107-
120	 on	 p.	 113).	 Miranda	 Fricker	 emphasises	 that	 systemic	 testimonial	 injustices	 often	 operate	 along	
identity-prejudicial	parameters,	which	 in	 turn	rely	on	widely	held	associations	between	 “a	given	social	
group	and	one	or	more	attributes”	of	 it	(Miranda	Fricker,	Epistemic	Injustice	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	
Press,	2007),	p.	30).	In	a	similar	vein,	Iris	Marion	Young	wants	to	acknowledge	the	social	reality	of	existing	
social	groups	(Young,	Justice	and	the	Politics	of	Difference,	p.	47),	but	also	stresses	that	social	groups	do	not	
share	a	common	nature	or	essence,	but	arise	from	“social	relations	and	processes”	(p.	48).	She	somewhat	
inconclusively	defines	a	social	group	as	“a	collective	of	persons,	differentiated	from	at	least	one	other	group	
by	cultural	forms,	practices	or	way	of	life.”	(Young,	ibid.	p.	43).	
13	Cf.	Rainer	Forst,	“Noumenal	Power”,	The	Journal	of	Political	Philosophy,	23,	2	(2015),	pp.	111–234. 
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has	been	developed	recently:	hermeneutic	injustice,	understood	as	the	lack	of	concepts	
necessary	for	the	articulation	of	experiences	of	the	oppressed.14	Hermeneutic	injustice	
concerns	 the	 differential	 standing	 of	 members	 of	 oppressed	 groups	 in	 interpretive	
practices	and	processes	of	reason-giving	upon	which	the	generation	of	social	meanings	
necessary	to	uphold	social	rules	relies.	It	has	to	do	with	the	kind	of	epistemic	authority	
on	the	basis	of	which	one	can	establish	oneself	as	an	equal	member	of	a	community	of	
knowledge	 and	 with	 the	 shared	 practices	 of	 elaboration	 and	 contestation	 of	 social	
meanings.		
	 This	is	an	important	aspect	of	structural	injustice.	However,	there	is	also	another	
important	 epistemic	 dimension	 to	 structural	 injustice	 that	 has	 been	 noticed	 less.	 The	
danger	 is	 not	 simply	 the	 marginalisation	 of	 certain	 voices	 in	 their	 allegedly	 equal	
participation	 in	the	 formation	of	social	meanings.	 It	 is	also	that,	 to	 the	extent	 that	 the	
views	of	the	oppressed	tend	to	take	shape	in	such	a	distorted	epistemic	environment,	the	
oppressed	 themselves	 might	 not	 be	 able	 to	 fully	 understand	 or	 acknowledge	 their	
perspective	 of	 marginalisation,	 internalising	 the	 very	 interpretive	 practices	 and	
conventions	that	stand	in	need	of	correction.15	The	development	of	adaptive	preferences	
is	of	course	one	expression	of	this	problem,	one	that	has	already	been	discussed.16	But	
what	follows	from	that	when	it	comes	to	the	political	responsibilities	of	the	oppressed?		
	 The	epistemic	dimension	of	structural	injustice	has	important	implications	for	the	
discussion	of	the	responsibilities	of	the	oppressed.	On	the	one	hand,	if	epistemic	injustice	
obtains,	it	is	very	hard	for	those	on	the	receiving	end	of	structural	oppression	not	only	to	
articulate,	but	sometimes	even	to	acknowledge,	the	source	of	their	oppression	and	the	
responsibility	to	fight	it.	On	the	other	hand,	precisely	because	epistemic	injustice	obtains,	
it	is	crucial	that	the	experience	of	correction	of	defective	norms,	beliefs	and	conventions	
come	from	the	oppressed	themselves	and	not	only	from	those	who	seek	to	act	on	their	
behalf.	If	the	projection	of	dominant	processes	of	reason-giving,	interpretive	schemes	and	
social	meanings	needs	to	be	corrected,	the	suffering,	reactive	emotions,	and	judgements	
                                                             
14	Here	we	mainly	follow	Miranda	Fricker’s	definition	of	hermeneutic	injustice	in	Fricker	Epistemic	Injustice	
see	p.	7	and	pp.	147	ff.		
15	Building	on	his	cognitive	interpretation	of	social	power,	Rainer	Forst	has	gone	as	far	as	suggesting	that	
structural	oppression	itself	should	be	understood	as	the	process	of	“closing	off	of	the	space	of	justifications”	
such	that	asymmetrical	social	relations	appear	as	“legitimate,	natural,	God-given	or	in	any	way	unalterable”	
because	“the	realm	of	reasons	is	sealed	off”.	Forst,	"Noumenal	Power"	at	p.	125.	
16 	See,	 for	 example,	 Serene	 Khader,	Adaptive	 Preferences	 and	Women’s	 Empowerment	 (Oxford:	 Oxford	
University	Press,	2011).		
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specific	to	those	who	are	closely	connected	to	the	experience	of	oppression	will	provide	
an	important	source	for	doing	so.	The	reason	is	not	only	a	kind	of	"moral	deference"	owed	
to	victims	of	 injustice	 to	ensure	 that	one	 can	bear	witness	 to	 their	pain	 in	a	way	 that	
respects	their	feelings.17	It	is	also	that	any	account	seeking	to	remedy	structural	injustice	
in	 ignorance	of	 the	standpoint	of	 the	oppressed	would	be	both	paternalistic	and	more	
likely	to	err	–	an	important	point	that	standpoint-theorists	have	persuasively	made.18		
Yet	all	this	might	seem	to	reveal	a	tension.	Either	the	oppressed	are	sufficiently	
aware	 of	 their	 oppression	 and	 able	 to	 take	 up	 political	 responsibilities	 to	 remedy	
structural	injustice,	in	which	case	the	argument	for	epistemic	injustice	runs	the	risk	of	
appearing	 overstated.	 Or	 epistemic	 injustice	 is	 present	 and	 pervasive	 but	 then	 it	
paralyses	the	agency	of	the	oppressed	leaving	us,	as	in	Brecht’s	famous	phrase,	with	"only	
injustice	 and	 no	 outrage".19 	Indeed,	 acknowledging	 responsibilities	 presupposes	 that	
their	content	 is	 feasible	(‘ought	 implies	can’),	and	feasibility	 implies	general	epistemic	
awareness	by	the	duty-bearer	of	the	existence	of	obligations.	This	seems	to	render	the	
implications	of	epistemic	injustice	particularly	difficult	to	grapple	with	when	it	comes	to	
what	the	oppressed	themselves	can	do	in	order	to	end	their	plight.		
It	might	be	unhelpful,	however,	to	consider	this	problem	in	terms	of	either/or.	A	
more	constructive	approach	might	be	to	think	about	the	epistemic	aspects	of	structural	
injustice	and	their	relation	to	the	responsibilities	of	the	oppressed	as	a	matter	of	degree	
rather	 than	 full	 endorsement	 or	 full	 denial	 of	 their	 responsibilities.	 That	 is	 to	 say,	
different	 political	 responsibilities	might	 correspond	 to	 different	 degrees	 of	 epistemic	
awareness,	depending	on	agents'	perception	of	and	ability	to	reflect	on	the	injustice	they	
suffer	within	a	structure.	Taking	 into	account	the	different	 forms	that	such	awareness	
takes	might	lead	to	a	more	nuanced	analysis	of	the	responsibilities	of	the	oppressed	and,	
perhaps	 even	 mediate	 between	 the	 position	 of	 those	 who	 emphasize	 structural	
                                                             
17	Laurence	Thomas’	excellent	essay	on	“Moral	deference”	focuses	on	the	issue	of	empathy	in	explaining	
the	need	to	enlarge	one’s	perspective	and	incorporate	the	victims’	viewpoint	while	being	sensitive	to	the	
issue	that	it	is	impossible	to	experience	the	pain	of	another	person	without	being	that	other,	see	Laurence	
Thomas,	 "Moral	 deference"	 in:	 Theorizing	 Multiculturalism,	 ed.	 Cynthia	 Willet	 (Oxford:	 Blackwell	
Publishers,	1998),	pp.	359-381.	
18 	See	 for	 example	 Alison	Wylie’s	 claim	 that	 “those	 who	 are	 subject	 to	 structures	 of	 domination	 that	
systematically	marginalize	 and	 oppress	 them	may,	 in	 fact,	 be	 epistemically	 privileged	 in	 some	 crucial	
respects.	They	may	know	different	things,	or	know	some	things	better	than	those	who	are	comparatively	
privileged	(socially,	politically),	by	virtue	of	what	they	typically	experience	and	how	they	understand	their	
experience.“	Alison	Wylie,	“Why	Standpoint	Matters,”	in:	Science	and	Other	Cultures:	Issues	in	Philosophies	
of	Science	and	Technology,	ed.	Robert	Figueroa	and	Sandra	Harding	(London:	Routledge,	2003),	at	p.	339.	
19	Bertolt	Brecht,	"To	those	born	later"	in	Poetry	and	Prose,	ed.	by	Reinhold	Grimm	(New	York:	Continuum	
Publishing,	2003),	p.	70.	
 9 
constraints	on	individual	experiences	of	injustice	and	those	who	insist	on	victims’	agency	
and	responsibility	to	overcome	it.		
	
IV.	Epistemic	awareness	and	the	responsibilities	of	the	oppressed	
	
Let	 us	 start	 our	 discussion	 of	 the	 responsibility	 of	 the	 oppressed	 by	 focusing	 on	 the	
political	responsibilities	of	“epistemically	aware”	agents.	By	“epistemically	aware”	agents	
we	mean	those	oppressed	agents	who	understand	and	recognize	the	existence	of	injustice,	
its	structural	nature	and	how	it	affects	them	as	members	of	a	disempowered	social	group.	
For	obvious	reasons,	most	discussions	of	responsibilities	of	the	oppressed	have	assumed	
such	epistemically	aware	–	and	politically	conscious	–	agents	to	be	the	central	reference	
group.	An	agent	is	said	to	be	resisting	oppression	when	that	agent	"engages	in	an	act	that	
issues	 from	an	actual	case	of	oppression,	 in	 the	right	way".	This	in	 turn	means	that	 the	
agent	must	"intend"	to	"lessen	oppression"	and	"send	a	message	of	revolt"	through	her	
actions.20	Since	what	is	unjust	in	cases	of	structural	oppression	are	social	rules,	it	seems	
plausible	 to	 suggest	 that	 their	 disruption	 and	 reform	 requires	 some	 collective	 and	
political	 action.	 Hence	 it	 seems	 obvious	 that	 oppressed	 agents	who	 are	 epistemically	
aware	 have	 a	 responsibility	 to	 contribute	 to	 collective	 political	 action	 against	 their	
oppression.		
A	 paradigmatic	 illustration	of	how	 such	 responsibilities	 are	 usually	 discharged	
might	be	the	campaigns	of	resistance	to	exploitation	represented	by	workers’	strikes	for	
much	of	the	20th	century	history.	We	could	describe	such	protests	as	instances	in	which	
most	of	 the	oppressed	are	epistemically	aware	of	 their	condition	of	oppression	–	 they	
know	both	that	they	suffer	from	an	injustice	and	that	it	is	structural	in	nature.	Therefore,	
they	 make	 important	 sacrifices	 to	 take	 up	 a	 demanding	 responsibility	 to	 challenge	
structural	 injustice.	For	example,	epistemically	aware	activists	(e.g.	union	 leaders)	are	
able	 to	 successfully	 identify	 those	 complicit	 with	 the	 production	 or	 replication	 of	
structural	rules	and	to	organise	collective	action	(prior	to	unionisation	these	initiatives	
would	have	either	been	absent	for	fear	of	sanctions	or	taken	a	more	individual	or	more	
spontaneous	 form).	 The	 duty	 to	 create	 appropriate	 political	 structures	 enabling	
                                                             
20	Cf.	Cudd,	Analysing	Oppression,	pp.	188-195.		
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disruptive	interventions,	to	identify	and	organise	the	oppressed	agents	responsible	for	
carrying	out	such	interventions	and	to	reflect	on	the	adequacy	of	possible	alternatives	is	
most	clearly	discharged	by	agents	who	are	fully	epistemically	aware	both	of	the	injustice	
suffered	and	of	the	structural	nature	of	that	injustice.		
	 To	spell	out	in	greater	detail	how	epistemically	aware	oppressed	agents	might	go	
about	 discharging	 their	 political	 responsibilities,	 it	 might	 be	 worth	 distinguishing	
between	 different	 stages	 in	 the	 process	 (this	 will	 also	 help	 us	 reflect	 on	 the	
responsibilities	of	oppressed	agents	under	conditions	of	epistemic	opacity	later	on).	As	a	
first	 step,	 what	 might	 be	 required	 is	 mere	 sensitivity	 to	 the	 many	 scattered	 and	
apparently	unrelated	instances	of	wrongdoing	as	revealed	through	either	the	suffering	
and	actions	of	the	oppressed	themselves	or	through	a	counter-factual	comparison	with	
the	 position	 in	which	 they	would	 be	 if	 the	 constraining	 conditions	 under	which	 they	
operate	were	removed.	At	this	stage	one	might	for	example	be	asking	why	it	is	mostly	the	
workers	and	not	the	capitalists	suffering	from	low	income,	bad	health	and	low	levels	of	
access	to	education.		
As	a	second	step,	one	would	need	to	rely	on	the	observations	obtained	to	reflect	
on	the	possibility	of	a	pattern	linking	the	individual	cases	of	suffering:	do	the	observed	
agents	display	any	characteristics	in	common?	Are	they	situated	in	a	similar	position?	Are	
there	any	properties	 that	 they	 share	and	 that	 seem	 to	 link	all	 of	 these	 cases?	Can	we	
account	 for	 exceptions?	 This	 second	 stage	 would	 allow	 to	 uncover	 a	 pattern	 behind	
individual	 cases	 of	wronging	 and	 expose	 them	 as	 part	 of	 a	wider	 structure	 of	 power	
relations	which	conditions	the	resources,	positions	and	opportunities	of	those	subjected	
to	it	–	in	short	it	would	unveil	them	as	injustices	as	opposed	to	misfortunes.	At	this	stage,	
one	 would	 for	 example	 be	 uncovering	 a	 pattern	 of	 generally	 unequal	 distribution	 of	
power	and	resources	between	workers	and	capitalists,	as	observed	by	an	analysis	of	the	
distribution	of	roles	they	perform	and	by	an	analysis	of	their	relation.		
But	revealing	a	pattern	is	also	not	enough.	What	seems	required	further	is	linking	
that	pattern	to	a	system	of	social	rules	that	produces	or	replicates	an	injustice	and	this	
leads	to	a	third	step:	an	analysis	of	the	norms,	social	rules	and	conventions	through	which	
the	 pattern	 takes	 shape.	 This	 amounts	 to	 revealing	 the	 structural	 character	 of	 the	
injustice	 at	 stake.	 Norms,	 social	 rules	 and	 conventions	 support	 the	 organisation	 of	
experience	by	providing	a	predictable	background	with	reference	to	which	our	actions	
become	meaningful,	connect	past	experiences	with	present	and	future	ones	and	create	
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regularities	through	which	it	is	possible	to	recognise	and	continue	to	play	one's	role	in	a	
system.	Again,	what	makes	such	social	rules	structurally	unjust	is	not	only	that	they	tend	
to	 trigger	 an	 unequal	 allocation	 of	 roles	 and	 positions	 –	 for	 example	 by	 conferring	
advantages	to	members	of	some	groups	over	others	and	exacerbating	the	vulnerability	
of	 the	 latter	within	 a	 system.	What	makes	 such	 social	 rules	 structurally	 unjust	 is	 the	
stability	they	confer	on	such	patterns	by	themselves	expressing	and	perpetuating	deeper	
and	unjustifiable	power	differentials.	For	example,	at	this	stage	one	would	need	to	explain	
which	 underlying	 social	 rules	 and	 practices	 produce,	 stabilize	 and	 perpetuate	 the	
unequal	distribution	of	power	and	resources	between	workers	and	capitalists.	Therefore,	
particular	 attention	 must	 be	 drawn	 to	 those	 justification	 narratives	 stabilizing	 and	
legitimizing	such	norms,	social	rules	and	expectations.21	
The	responsibilities	to	unveil	and	explicate	unjust	structural	rules	seem	to	form	
an	 important	 part	 of	 the	 political	 responsibilities	 of	 those	 oppressed	 agents	who	 are	
epistemically	aware	of	structural	injustice.	Only	after	exposing	structural	injustice,	can	
one	turn	to	the	task	of	correcting	social	rules	shaping	unjust	patterns.	This	can	be	done	
by	empowering	oppressed	agents	to	have	a	say	in	such	remedial	processes,	by	identifying	
and	trying	to	establish	less	deficient	rules	and	by	promoting	political	activism	in	fighting	
for	them.22	
	As	we	 have	 described	 it,	 the	 political	 responsibility	 to	 help	 remedy	 structural	
injustice	involves	a	responsibility	to	act	both	at	the	level	of	uncovering	unjust	structural	
rules	and	at	 the	 level	of	organisation	and	support	 for	 collective	activities	 that	 seek	 to	
disrupt	and	change	them.	Epistemic	awareness	is	clearly	crucial	to	both	stages,	where	the	
responsibility	to	fight	oppression	is	most	demanding	and	the	costs	of	mobilisation	can	be	
very	 high.	 Yet,	 those	 epistemically	 aware	 agents	 in	 a	 position	 to	 discharge	 such	
responsibilities	might	only	be	a	scattered	few.	
However,	 the	 content	 of	 the	 political	 responsibilities	 of	 those	 who	 are	 in	 a	
condition	 of	 epistemic	 opacity	 is	 not	 immediately	 obvious.	 Can	 those	 in	 conditions	of	
epistemic	opacity	contribute	to	any	of	the	stages	of	the	process	described	above?	Or	are	
they	mere	recipients	of	the	benefits	conferred	to	them	by	epistemically	aware	members	
of	their	group	while	remaining	complicit	in	the	reproduction	of	a	system	of	rules	which	
                                                             
21	See	for	a	discussion	of	this	problem	Rainer	Forst,	Normativität	und	Macht	(Frankfurt:	Suhrkamp,	2015),	
ch.	3.	
22	For	 a	 discussion	 of	 the	 role	 of	 political	 activism	and	 the	 relation	 between	 theory	 and	practice	more	
generally,	see	Author	B	XXX.		
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they	fail	to	subject	to	critical	scrutiny?	The	answer	to	these	questions	depends	on	how	
exactly	we	articulate	their	condition	of	epistemic	opacity,	a	problem	to	which	the	next	
section	turns.	
	
V.	Total	and	partial	epistemic	opacity	
	
Earlier	we	argued	that	being	affected	by	structural	injustice	at	an	epistemic	level	entails	
suffering	from	a	kind	of	epistemic	disadvantage	which	prevents	an	agent	from	developing	
the	appropriate	interpretive	and	evaluative	categories	enabling	her	to	be	epistemically	
aware	of	her	own	oppression.	Such	an	agent	will	find	herself	in	conditions	of	what	we	
have	 called	 epistemic	 opacity	with	 regard	 to	her	 political	 responsibilities	 required	 to	
overcome	structural	injustice.	Epistemic	opacity	can	in	turn	take	different	forms.	The	first	
and	most	problematic	one	is	what	we	might	call	total	epistemic	opacity.	Total	epistemic	
opacity	involves	the	inability	to	acknowledge	that	the	various	forms	of	disempowerment	
that	an	agent	suffers	from	are	part	of	a	wider	unjust	pattern,	and	that	this	pattern	might	
result	 from	 a	 system	 of	 rules	 that	 is	 structurally	 unjust.	 In	 this	 case	 an	 agent	 might	
experience	various	 forms	of	disadvantage	but	she	will	perceive	these	as	 the	results	of	
moral	wrongs.	 In	 other	words,	 she	might	 think	 that	 those	who	 treat	 her	wrongly	 are	
violating	moral	norms,	but	not	because	she	is	a	disempowered	member	of	any	particular	
group.	She	will	 lack	the	epistemic	resources	needed	to	perceive	the	disadvantage	as	a	
form	of	injustice	with	structural	roots.	Instead,	she	might	be	more	inclined	to	categorise	
her	predicament	as	a	result	of	unfortunate	encounters,	own	individual	failures,	random	
circumstances	working	 against	 her	 or	 the	 corrupt	 nature	 of	 others.	 She	will	 in	 other	
words	deny	both	that	what	she	suffers	is	an	injustice,	as	opposed	to	a	misfortune,	and	
that	this	injustice	has	structural	roots.23		
To	better	understand	this	case,	consider	the	example	of	an	immigrant	guestworker	
who	 is	 paid	 very	 little,	 frequently	 required	 to	 perform	 out-of-hours	 jobs,	 or	 verbally	
abused	by	an	employer	who	ridicules	his	strange	cultural	habits.	Such	a	worker	might	
lack	the	epistemic	resources	needed	to	understand	his	predicament	as	one	that	stems	
                                                             
23	Some	of	these	issues	are	well-captured	in	the	vast	social	psychological	literature	on	correspondence	bias	
and	 attribution	 errors	 concerning	 structural	 background	 conditions,	 see	 for	 a	 review	 and	 influential	
analysis	Daniel	Gilbert	and	Patrick	Malone,	 “The	Correspondence	Bias”,	Psychological	Bulletin,	 vol.	117,	
issue	1	(1995),	pp.	21-38.		
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from	structural	 injustice.	For	example,	he	might	not	see	that	his	employer	thrives	 in	a	
system	of	rules	 that	prohibits	 foreign	workers	 from	taking	advantage	of	 the	country’s	
labour	laws,	that	prevents	him	from	accessing	various	forms	of	union	protection	and	that	
would	guarantee	him	social	securities	and	render	him	less	vulnerable	to	exploitation	and	
abuse.	 This	 worker	 might	 simply	 think	 that	 he	 is	 in	 the	 unfortunate	 position	 of	 his	
employer	being	a	jerk	who	wrongs	him	morally.	He	might	also	think	that	his	predicament	
is	one	of	personal	risk-aversion:	although	if	he	were	to	change	employment	his	position	
might	end	up	being	different,	he	thinks	he	cannot	afford	to	take	the	risk.	Our	immigrant	
worker	is	in	a	position	of	total	epistemic	opacity:	he	does	not	see	that	he	is	the	victim	of	
an	injustice	(let	alone	of	a	structural	one),	but	thinks	he	is	the	victim	of	an	interpersonal	
moral	wrong.	This	makes	 it	very	difficult	 to	assign	him	responsibilities	 for	remedying	
structural	injustice.	
Secondly,	consider	a	slightly	different	case	of	epistemic	opacity:	what	we	might	call	
partial	 epistemic	opacity.	 Imagine	 the	poor	 citizens	of	 a	poor	 country,	whose	political	
institutions	fare	badly	with	regard	to	their	ability	to	respond	to	the	concerns	of	citizens,	
for	example	to	reduce	social	poverty	and	inequality	or	to	satisfy	even	basic	standards	of	
personal	security.	When	asked	to	assess	the	plight	of	their	country,	its	citizens	might	very	
well	 point	 to	 the	 persistence	 of	 injustices,	 for	 example	 they	 might	 blame	 corrupt	
politicians,	the	fact	that	other	fellow-citizens	only	pursue	private	interests	or	the	fact	that	
people	 fail	 to	 obey	 the	 law.	 Of	 course,	 this	 diagnosis	might	 capture	 one	 part	 of	 their	
predicament,	but	it	is	also	plausible	to	think	of	their	situation	as	an	instance	of	a	structural	
injustice,	one	that	inherits	its	wrongness	from	a	more	fundamental	level,	which	has	to	do	
with	the	way	in	which	the	system	of	rules	that	shapes	interactions	among	people	in	that	
state	has	emerged	and	 is	 replicated.	Although	 these	 citizens	are	 right	 to	observe	 that	
there	is	an	injustice	that	afflicts	them,	they	are	mistaken	or	have	only	a	partial	reading	of	
what	explains	the	persistence	of	that	injustice.	We	might	say	that,	for	example,	they	fail	
to	pay	sufficient	attention	to	the	legacy	of	the	past	history	of	colonialism	on	their	current	
political	institutions	or	to	how	the	rules	that	shape	the	very	international	standards	that	
they	are	encouraged	(and	sometimes	constrained)	to	adopt	often	tend	to	advantage	the	
more	 powerful	 states	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 the	 weaker.	 In	 this	 case,	 epistemic	 opacity	
accounts	for	the	inability	to	link	one's	keenly	felt	sense	that	some	injustice	is	being	done	
with	 the	 more	 fundamental	 structural	 rules	 responsible	 for	 the	 generation	 and	
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replication	of	that	injustice.24	
Against	the	backdrop	of	the	analysis	of	the	case	of	epistemically	aware	agents,	it	might	
look	as	 if	 it	 is	 impossible	 for	oppressed	people	 in	 conditions	of	 either	partial	or	 total	
epistemic	opacity	to	take	political	responsibility	for	structural	injustice.	Being	helpless	in	
detecting	the	structural	roots	of	their	grievances,	they	might	be	thought	unable	to	channel	
reactive	 feelings	of	 frustration,	 resentment	or	anger	 in	 the	 right	way.25	And	yet,	 if	we	
consider	political	responsibilities	among	the	oppressed	as	a	matter	of	degree,	it	is	still	
possible	 for	 victims	 of	 structural	 injustice	 in	 conditions	 of	 epistemic	 opacity	 to	make	
some,	proportionate,	contribution.		
Consider	again	our	two	cases:	agents	who	are	unaware	either	that	they	suffer	from	an	
injustice	or	that	the	injustice	from	which	they	suffer	has	a	structural	component.		In	the	
first	case	(total	epistemic	opacity)	it	seems	still	possible	to	ask	agents	to	take	political	
responsibility	for	voicing	their	dissatisfaction,	even	if	we	do	not	expect	them	to	locate	the	
sources	of	 that	dissatisfaction	 in	 the	appropriate	 site.	 In	doing	 so	 they	will	be	able	 to	
participate	in	the	creation	of	a	community	of	epistemic	solidarity26	which	will	facilitate	
the	 first	 stage	 of	 the	 process	 necessary	 to	 undermine	 structural	 injustice	 that	 we	
identified	 above:	 observing	 individual	 instances	 of	moral	wronging	 and	 reflecting	 on	
shared	 features	 of	 individual	 experiences	 of	 such	 wrongs	 so	 as	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	
identification	of	a	potential	pattern	of	injustice.	Notice	that	this	does	not	require	agents	
in	 conditions	 of	 total	 epistemic	 opacity	 to	 establish	 the	 link	 between	 their	 individual	
experiences	and	structural	injustice	themselves.	All	it	requires	of	them	is	to	be	sensitive	
to	the	treatment	they	receive	from	others,	to	give	their	views	on	the	reasons	for	why	the	
hardship	 they	 face	 occurs	 and	 to	 share	 the	 cognitive	 experiences	 they	 accumulate,	
                                                             
24
 For	a	discussion	of	this	problem	and	people’s	propensity	to	misattribute	the	causes	of	poverty,	see	
Robin	Zheng,	“A	Job	for	Philosophers:	Causality,	Responsibility,	and	Explaining	Social	Inequality”	in	
Dialogue:	Canadian	Philosophical	Review,	vol.	57,	issue	2,	pp.	323-351.	See	also	some	of	the	sources	on	
which	her	paper	draws,	e.g.	N.	Maseko,	D	Viljoen,	PF	Muzindutsi		“Determinants	of	Perceived	Causes	of	
Poverty	among	South	Africa’s	Post-Apartheid	Generation”	in	Journal	of	Human	Ecology,	vol.	52,	issue	3	
(2015),	pp.	160-7,	A.Nayak,	J.	Pradhan	and	R.	Biswal	“Assessing	the	Perception	of	Indian	Youths	towards	
Poverty”	in	Social	Science	International	vol.	30,	issue	2	(2014),	pp.	317-330,	Ng,	I.	Y.H.	and	Koh,	G,	
“Chinese	Singaporean	attitudes	towards	poverty	and	inequality:	A	comparative	analysis”.	International	
Journal	of	Social	Welfare,	vol.	21,	issue	2	(2012),	pp.	149–159,	L.	P.	Da	Costa	and	J.	Dias,	“What	do	
Europeans	Believe	to	be	the	Causes	of	Poverty?	A	Multilevel	Analysis	of	Heterogeneity	Within	and	
Between	Countries”	in	“Social	Indicators	Research”,	vol.	122,	issue	1	(2015)	pp.	1-20.	We	are	very	grateful	
to	one	of	the	reviewers	for	these	suggestions. 
25	Cf.	Cudd,	Analysing	Oppression.	
26	Cf.	Robert	E.	Goodin	and	Kai	Spiekermann,	"Epistemic	solidarity	as	a	political	strategy",	Episteme,		vol.	12,	
issue	4	(2015),	pp.	439-457.	
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potentially	 correcting	 each	 other's	 misperceptions,	 consolidating	 what	 seem	 like	
plausible	 views	 and	so	on.	 This	 can	 occur	 in	 the	 usual	 sites	of	 socialisation	 (be	 them	
workplaces,	social	networking	groups,	educational	institutions	or	even	simply	the	café	or	
the	 pub).	 Voicing	 dissatisfaction	with	 single	 episodes	 of	 abuse	 or	mistreatment	 helps	
provide	necessary	epistemic	material	for	the	wider	social	process	of	unveiling	structural	
injustice.	For	example,	individual	stories	about	problematic	episodes	can	help	increase	
sensitivity	 to	 individual	 cases	 of	 injustice	 by	 rendering	 more	 visible	 (if	 not	 explicit)	
implicit	bias,	by	challenging	assumptions	that	are	usually	perceived	as	unthreatening	and	
by	beginning	the	process	of	sensitizing	to	the	way	in	which	structural	rules	inform	the	
epistemic	resources	available	to	critically	reflect	on	the	structure.		
In	 the	 case	 of	 agents	 in	 conditions	 of	 partial	 epistemic	 opacity,	 political	
responsibilities	seem	to	go	even	further.	What	distinguishes	agents	under	conditions	of	
partial	epistemic	opacity	from	epistemically	aware	agents	is	the	fact	that	they	know	that	
they	are	subjected	to	an	 injustice,	but	do	not	grasp	 its	structural	nature.	For	example,	
such	 agents	might	 deplore	 the	 existence	 of	material	 inequality	 between	workers	 and	
capitalists,	 but	 fail	 to	 see	 the	 underlying	 structural	 reasons	 for	 this	 distribution.	 But	
notice	that	since	these	agents	acknowledge	the	presence	of	an	injustice,	they	still	have	
responsibilities	 for	 associating	 with	 others	 to	 remedy	 it.	 Through	 the	 process	 of	
associating	 with	 others	 for	 collective	 political	 action,	 such	 agents	might	 also	 acquire	
additional	 (epistemic)	 responsibilities	 to	 reflect	 on	 the	 sources	of	 that	 injustice.	 Such	
epistemic	responsibilities	might	consist,	for	example,	in	comparing	different	instances	of	
injustice,	 seeking	 to	 cluster	 together	 potentially	 relevant	 phenomena,	 identifying	 a	
pattern	 behind	 individual	 cases	 and	 thus	 contributing	 to	 rendering	 explicit	 certain	
concealed	 norms.	 Agents	 who	 experience	 their	 struggle	 as	 a	 struggle	 for	 justice	 will	
usually	be	easier	to	organise	than	those	who	only	see	their	plight	as	an	individual	one.	
While	in	the	latter	case	all	that	can	be	required	is	to	take	up	a	responsibility	to	speak	out	
(even	if	such	speaking	out	does	not	necessarily	take	a	politically	coordinated	form),	in	the	
former	case	we	might	go	further	and	reflect	on	the	responsibilities	that	such	agents	might	
have	for	finding	opportunities	for	collective	political	action	that	lead	them	to	challenge	
the	injustices	they	experience.	In	doing	so	the	structural	roots	of	that	injustice	might	start	
becoming	 more	 transparent	 still:	 such	 agents	 will	 realise	 for	 example	 that	 there	 are	
structural	obstacles	to	remedying	the	problems	at	the	level	in	which	they	initially	thought	
they	 needed	 to	 be	 remedied,	 and	 the	 process	 of	 acquisition	 of	 further	 epistemic	
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awareness	 on	 the	 roots	 of	 their	 injustice	 will	 proceed	 in	 parallel	 to	 the	 process	 of	
constructing	political	initiatives	designed	to	challenge	that	injustice.27		
One	might	object	here	that	all	this	is	places	to	high	a	burden	on	the	oppressed.	For	
example,	why	should	a	black	person	who	already	faces	the	burden	of	suffering	from	racial	
stereotype	not	only	continue	to	bear	that	burden	but	also	face	the	further	responsibility	
to	sensitize	members	of	a	racist	society	to	its	prejudices?28	This	seems	doubly	unfair.29	It	
is	undeniably	burdensome	to	demand	a	black	person	to	sensitise	her	oppressor	to	their	
employment	 of	 racial	 stereotypes	 and	 to	 encourage	 victims	 of	 oppression	 to	 do	
emotionally	taxing	extra-work,	all	the	while	they	continue	to	be	victims	of	racial	prejudice.	
Here	it	is	important	to	acknowledge	the	strength	of	the	objection	and	qualify	our	claim	
by	emphasising	that	we	do	not	suggest	that	the	political	responsibilities	we	have	outlined	
override	 all	 other	 considerations.	 Obviously,	 the	 content	 of	 the	 responsibilities	of	 the	
oppressed	 needs	 to	 be	 determined	 also	 with	 a	 view	 to	 other	 considerations	 such	 as	
overall	costs,	other	constraints	on	agency,	and	also	such	considerations	of	second-order	
unfairness.	Here	we	 try	 to	 spell	out	 the	 content	of	 the	political	 responsibilities	of	 the	
oppressed	 with	 regard	 to	 one	 important	 component,	 namely	 their	 varying	 degree	 of	
epistemic	awareness.	And	we	make	a	case	for	considering	the	component	of	epistemic	
awareness	when	thinking	about	 the	political	responsibilities	of	 the	oppressed.	But	we	
have	not	argued	that	this	requirement	should	trump	all	other	important	considerations.	
	
	
VI.	The	case	of	“exceptionalism”	
 
                                                             
27 	Indeed,	 a	 similar	 process	 of	 acquisition	 of	 further	 epistemic	 awareness	 in	 the	 course	 of	 taking	
responsibility	for	 remedying	what	appear	as	more	 limited	 (i.e.	non-structural)	 forms	of	 injustice	is	not	
atypical	of	many	historical	cases	of	rebellion.	Historically,	it	has	often	been	the	case	that	a	struggle	driven	
by	a	concern	for	specific	issues	and	reaction	against	limited	forms	of	injustice	enacts	a	collective	epistemic	
process	in	which	further	causes	of	grievance	are	identified	and	linked	by	a	pattern	that	was	previously	
invisible	to	oppressed	agents	themselves.	
28	Audre	Lorde	poignantly	puts	this	objection	as	follows:	“Black	and	Third	World	people	are	expected	to	
educate	white	people	as	to	our	humanity.	Women	are	expected	to	educate	men.	Lesbians	and	gay	men	are	
expected	 to	 educate	 the	 heterosexual	 world.	 The	 oppressors	 maintain	 their	 position	 and	 evade	 their	
responsibility	for	 their	own	actions.	There	is	a	 constant	drain	of	energy	which	might	be	better	used	 in	
redefining	ourselves	and	devising	realistic	scenarios	for	altering	the	present	and	constructing	the	future.	
See,	Audre	Lorde,	“Age,	Race,	Class,	and	Sex:	Women	Redefining	Difference“	in	Sister	Outsider:	Essays	and	
Speeches,	(Freedom	CA:	Crossing	Press,	1984),	p.	114,	also	see	Carol	Hay’s	illuminating	discussion	of	this	
problem	in	“The	Obligation	to	Resist	Oppression”	at	p.	32	ff.		
29	We	thank	an	anonymous	referee	for	raising	this	objection.	
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A	third	version	of	epistemic	opacity	 is	when	 individual	members	of	oppressed	groups	
accept	the	presence	of	structural	injustice	with	regard	to	their	group	but	mistakenly	deny	
that	they	personally	are	affected	by	it:	a	slightly	different	form	of	denial	of	the	structural	
nature	 of	 injustice	 we	 discussed	 above.	 We	 suggest	 to	 label	 this	 phenomenon	
“exceptionalism”.	Take	 the	example	of	women	 in	academia	who	agree	 that	 in	general	
their	social	group	(women	in	academia)	suffer	from	some	form	of	structural	injustice	but	
affirm	that	they	are	immune	from	it.	For	example,	they	might	think	that	they	are	exempt	
from	 such	 structural	 injustice	 because	 their	 employers	 and	 colleagues	 have	 long	
overcome	sexist	gender-norms	or	because	they	are	immune	to	biased	sexist	remarks.	Or	
think	about	the	example	of	hard-working	immigrants,	who	acknowledge	the	existence	of	
xenophobic	norms	in	their	new	society	but	think	that	they	are	lucky	not	to	be	affected	by	
those	 because	 they	 are	 blessed	 with	 non-xenophobic	 neighbours,	 colleagues	 or	
employers.	
	 The	position	of	such	oppressed	agents	is	also	one	of	epistemic	opacity.	Precisely	
because	 of	 its	 structural	 character	with	 regard	 to	 various	 forms	 of	 disempowerment	
structural	oppression	must	affect	all	members	of	disadvantaged	groups.	While	agential	
oppression	(i.e.	oppression	that	is	directed	or	individualised)	might	indeed	be	absent	in	
such	cases,	 structural	oppression	 is	 still	present	and	as	 such	determines	not	only	 the	
pattern	of	distribution	of	freedoms,	options	or	life-chances,	but	also	the	underlying	social	
rules	 generating	 and	 perpetuating	 such	 distributions.	 Thus,	 a	 female	 member	 of	 an	
upper-class	group	might	encounter	more	deference	than	discrimination	in	her	everyday	
life	 but	 this	 does	 not	mean	 that	qua	woman	 the	 rules	 structuring	 her	 ability	 to	make	
projects	are	not	constrained	 in	the	ways	we	discuss.	30	One	might	of	course	still	object	
that	 some	 intersectional	 identities	mitigate	 the	 effects	 of	 oppression	 to	 the	 extent	 of	
making	it	impossible	for	victims	of	structural	injustice	to	voice	their	critique	in	the	ways	
we	have	described.31	But	 if	our	analysis	on	 the	ascription	of	political	 responsibility	 to	
everyone	 implicated	 in	 structural	 injustice	 is	 correct,	 how	 much	 of	 the	 injustice	 is	
                                                             
30	Demands	for	an	intersectional	analysis	have	been	raised	by	many	feminist	and	critical	race	theorists.	
Among	others	see	Hooks,	Bell,	Ain’t	I	a	Women:	Black	Women	and	Feminism	(Boston:	South	End	Press	1981)	
and	Spelman,	Elizabeth	“Woman:		The	One	and	the	Many.”,	in	Feminist	Social	Thought:		A	Reader.		Ed.	Diana	
Tietjens	Meyers	(London:	Routledge	1997),	pp.	161-79.	
31	We	thank	an	anonymous	referee	for	raising	this	objection.	For	an	account	that	highlights	the	mitigating	
effects	of	an	‘additive’	approach	to	intersectionality,	see	Serene	Khader,	“Intersectionality	and	the	Ethics	
of	Transnational	Commercial	Surrogacy”,	in:	International	Journal	of	Feminist	Approaches	to	Bioethics	6/1	
(2013)	68-9. 
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mitigated	 in	 this	 way	 is	 also	 a	 matter	 of	 degree.	 Therefore,	 the	 objection	 does	 not	
invalidate	what	we	call	for:	an	account	of	the	content	of	victims’	responsibilities	which	is	
sensitive	to	their	varying	degree	of	epistemic	awareness.	Conceding	this	point	still	leaves	
plenty	of	space	for	arguing	that	intersecting	group-memberships	can	open	up	different	
strategies	and	spaces	 for	resistance,	protection	or	articulation	of	novel	 identities	with	
regard	to	experiences	of	oppression.		
To	 determine	 what	 the	 responsibilities	 of	 the	 oppressed	 are	 in	 cases	 of	
exceptionalism,	it	might	make	sense	to	take	a	closer	look	into	why	certain	agents	think	
they	are	exempt	 from	structural	oppression.	 In	what	 follows	we	want	 to	 suggest	 that	
individually	 rational	 reasons	 for	 exceptionalism	 all	 relate	 to	 the	 primary	 action-
environment	 of	 those	 affected,	 who	 fail	 to	 link	 their	 first-order	 experiences	 to	
disempowerment	occurring	at	the	level	of	higher-order	social	rules.	So	why	might	our	
female	 academic	 think	 that	 justice-related	 problems	 with	 regard	 to	 women	 in	 the	
academic	system	exist,	but	do	not	apply	to	her	personally?	One	first	reason	might	be	that	
she	acts	in	such	a	way	as	to	avoid	negative	constraints	or	punishments	on	the	level	of	her	
primary	 action-environment.	 If	 she	 avoids	 wearing	 particular	 clothes	 and	 eschews	
certain	 kinds	 of	 interaction	 with	 her	 male	 colleagues	 and	 superiors	 in	 order	 not	 to	
become	objectified	or	sexualised,	we	could	 say	 that	she	 responds	 to	oppressive	 social	
rules	 with	 anticipatory	 deference. 32 	This	 might	 amount	 to	 a	 variant	 of	 internalised	
oppression:	 the	 oppressive	 norms	 are	 internalised	 in	 such	 a	manner	 as	 to	make	 the	
oppression	invisible	in	the	first	place.33		
A	second	reason	for	exceptionalism	could	be	that	some	oppressed	agents	might	
not	admit	to	any	negative	repercussions	of	structural	injustice	because	they	are	complicit	
with	and	in	some	ways	benefit	from	the	oppressive	system	of	rules.	We	might	label	this	
attitude:	beneficial	compliance.	One	such	example	is	that	of	naturalised	immigrants	who	
absorb	dominant	xenophobic	norms	and	start	acting	by	them,	for	example	by	becoming	
hostile	 to	members	of	 their	own	group	of	origin	and	supporting	political	parties	with	
populist	anti-immigrant	agendas.	As	the	founder	of	the	right-wing	anti-immigrant	Swiss	
                                                             
32	See	for	example	Philip	Pettit’s	discussion	of	a	slave’s	anticipatory	deference	in	Philip	Pettit,	“Joining	the	
Dots”,	in	Common	Minds.	Themes	from	the	Philosophy	of	Philip	Pettit,	ed.	by	Geoffrey	Brennan	et	al.,	(Oxford,	
Oxford	University	Press,	2007),	pp.	215-344	on	p.	306.	
33	See	on	this	issue	Hay,	“The	Obligation	to	Resist	Oppression”,	p.	26	ff.	For	an	account	of	the	psychological	
effects	of	internalized	sexist	oppression,	see	Sandra	Bartky,	“On	psychological	Oppression,”	in	Femininity	
and	Domination:	Studies	in	the	Phenomenology	of	Oppression	(New	York:	Routledge,	1990),	pp.	22–32.	
 
 19 
People's	Party	(which	led	the	minaret	ban	campaign	and	supports	drastic	immigration	
cuts)	has	told	the	press,	much	of	the	party's	support	comes	from	foreigners,	in	particular	
young	second-generation	foreigners.34	
Notice	that	we	are	not	suggesting	here	that	complicit	victims	of	structural	injustice	
manage	 to	 escape	 structural	 oppression:	 unjust	 social	 rules	 still	 apply	 to	 them	 and	
oppress	them,	even	 if	 they	know	how	to	play	along.	As	Susan	Moller-Okin	has	argued,	
underlying	dominant	social	norms	(for	example	norms	concerning	the	role	of	marriage	
in	society)	still	affect	the	behaviour	of	those	seemingly	unconcerned	with	them	(as	is	the	
case	 when	 unmarried	 women	 take	 life	 and	 career	 decisions	 with	 a	 view	 to	 their	
anticipated	role	within	marriage	or	with	a	view	to	marriage	being	the	primary	societal	
goal	 ascribed	 to	 womanhood).35 	Similarly,	 social	 rules	 regulating	 the	 distribution	 of	
social	 power	 between	 particular	 social	 groups	 cannot	 really	 be	 avoided.	 Hence,	 even	
though	anticipatory	deference	or	beneficial	compliance	might	help	oppressed	agents	to	
avoid	suffering	from	negative	consequences	in	their	first-order	action-environment,	such	
agents	are	still	oppressed	structurally,	in	that	they	are	subject	to	a	system	of	norms	which	
persistently	 disempowers	 them	 qua	member	 of	 a	 disadvantaged	 group.	 For	 example,	
even	if	the	range	of	options	to	choose	from	become	formally	equalised	between	man	and	
women,	 the	 formation	 of	 females’	 capacity	 for	 choice	 –	 their	 higher-order	 power	 to	
choose	 for	 themselves	 –	 will	 be	 constrained	 by	 dominant	 sexist	 norms,	 for	 example	
concerning	marriage,	distributions	of	care-	and	household-work	within	marriage	etc.	
On	a	conception	of	justice	that	is	sensitive	to	structural	constraints	it	is	obvious	
how	such	attitudes	–	compatible	with	avoiding	negative	effects	on	one’s	primary	action-
environment	–	amount	to	a	significant	loss	in	the	higher-order	social	power	to	shape	the	
social	 rules	 significant	 to	 one’s	 own	 life.	 For	 this	 more	 demanding	 notion	 of	 non-
domination	to	be	in	place,	one	needs	to	be	able	to	consider	oneself	as	an	equal	participant	
to	the	interpretive	practices	on	which	the	generation	of	social	rules	and	meanings	rests.	
Importantly,	 oppressed	 agents	 who	 think	 they	 are	 exceptional,	 are	 not	 in	 an	 equal	
position	to	decide	about	the	social	meaning	of	the	norms	and	conventions	that	shape	and	
constraint	their	behaviour.	The	power	of	our	exceptional	female	academic	to	take	career-
                                                             
34 http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/what-attracts-immigrants-to-rightwing-politics-/38165754.	 Another	
example	is	the	case	of	complicit	ruling	elites	in	scenarios	of	colonisation	or	recent	decolonisation:	members	
of	such	groups	internalise	the	norms	and	conventions	of	colonial	masters	and	contribute	to	reinforcing	an	
oppressive	system	of	rules	which	then	becomes	invisible	to	them	at	an	agential	level.		
35	Susan	Moller-Okin,	“Justice	and	Gender",	Philosophy	and	Public	Affairs,	16,1	(1987):	42-72.	
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decisions,	decide	on	what	to	say,	how	to	appear	in	public	and	how	to	flourish	in	her	social	
environment	will	likely	be	curtailed	by	dominant	sexist	and	oppressive	social	rules	(even	
if	she	avoids	them,	defers	to	them	or	benefits	from	them).	Likewise,	as	long	as	xenophobic	
social	 rules	 prevail	 in	 the	 society	 of	 our	 hard-working	 immigrant,	 her	 agency	will	 be	
constrained	from	these	even	if	she	claims	not	to	be	negatively	affected	by	them.	Examples	
of	 such	 structural	 effects	might	 include	 the	 lack	 of	 appropriate	 role-models	 from	her	
social	group,	facing	comparatively	more	difficulties	in	pursuing	career-paths	perceived	
as	atypical,	special	demands	of	justification	both	from	culturally	dominant	and	latently	
xenophobic	 background-assumptions	 (“are	 you	 really	 sure	 your	 kids	 should	 enrol	 in	
higher	education”),	and	so	forth.	
Note	 that	 it	might	 be	 fully	 rational	 for	 oppressed	 agents	 to	 avoid	 linking	 their	
deferent	 or	 complicit	 strategies	 –	 skirting	 negative	 constraints	 on	 a	 primary	 action-
environment	–	to	the	question	of	disempowerment	with	regard	to	the	higher-order	level	
of	social	rules.	One	reason	for	this	might	be	to	avoid	feeling	victimised.36	A	second	reason	
might	be	that	individual	control	over	collective	social	rules	is	notoriously	limited	and	very	
difficult	to	obtain.	A	third	reason	might	be	ideologically	dominant	social	narratives	and	
imaginaries	 that	 conceptualise	 responsibility	 and	 agency	 on	 a	 purely	 individual	 level	
whilst	shielding	from	view	their	structural	and	social	preconditions.37		
Nevertheless,	the	danger	of	this	position	is	a	more	general	form	of	alienation	from	
one's	 social	 environment.	 Indeed,	 both	 strategies	 leading	 to	 exceptionalism	 –	
anticipatory	deference	and	beneficial	compliance	–	are	likely	to	come	at	some	cost,	such	
as	a	fractured	moral	system,	an	inherently	instable	and	dissonant	moral	experience	and	
might	even	go	as	far	as	to	cause	practical	irrationality	and	self-deception.38	In	addition,	
the	moral	reactions	of	third	parties	to	these	attitudes	are	likely	to	reflect	this	inherent	
                                                             
36	Indeed,	acknowledging	how	structural	oppression	also	applies	to	oneself	runs	the	risk	of	putting	one	
onto	 the	wrong	 side	 of	 the	 fence,	 turning	 one	 into	 an	 official	member	 of	 the	 group	 of	 the	 “weak”	 or	
“victimised”.	This	might	be	 linked	 to	a	general	 suspicion	 that	 structural	explanations	counter	personal	
achievements:	 if	our	female	academic	has	worked	long	and	hard	extra-hours	in	order	to	gain	the	same	
standing	as	her	male	colleagues,	it	might	be	a	general	reflex	to	deny	that	her	present	position	has	anything	
to	do	with	structural	 reasons.	Another	 important	 factor	here	might	be	 the	existence	of	powerful	 social	
narratives	of	blaming	the	victim	–	think	about	all	the	examples	of	everyday	discourse	which	blames	women	
for	behaving	in	a	 sexualised	way	and	 therefore	accuses	 them	of	bearing	some	responsibility	 for	 sexual	
assaults	on	them.	
37	This	has	been	an	important	criticism	of	Sandberg,	Sheryl,	Lean	In:	Women,	Work,	and	the	Will	to	Lead,	
(London:	WH	 Allen	 2013),	 see	 for	 example	 Rottenberg,	 Catherine,	 “The	 Rise	 of	Neoliberal	 Feminism”,	
Cultural	Studies,	Vol.	28	(2014),	pp.	418-437.		
38	Hay,	“The	Obligation	to	Resist	Oppression”	on	p.	24	ff.	
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moral	tension.	Third	parties	will	most	probably	not	view	complicit	or	deferent	behaviour	
as	an	expression	of	 autonomy	 in	an	abnormal	 social	moral	 context39,	 indeed	 they	are	
more	likely	to	view	it	as	individually	cunning	but	morally	problematic.		
Having	explained	why	exceptionalism	remains	untenable	and	self-delusive,	let	us	
return	to	our	 initial	question:	what	are	the	political	responsibilities	of	such	oppressed	
agents?	 Isn't	 it	 a	 little	 idle	 to	 simply	 posit	 responsibilities	 to	 change	 one’s	 own	
consciousness	and	take	a	more	epistemically	enlightened	standpoint	once	we	come	to	
terms	with	just	how	pervasive	these	agents'	condition	of	epistemic	opacity	might	be?	In	
the	previous	pages,	we	tried	to	show	how	one	particularly	salient	problem	in	cases	of	
exceptionalism	 is	 the	 missing	 link	 between	 individuals'	 adaptive	 strategies	 to	 a	
structurally	oppressive	environment	and	 their	 acknowledgement	of	 its	pervasiveness.	
We	have	also	argued	that	there	might	be	strong	reasons	for	why	individual	agents	avoid	
acknowledging	this	link.		
One	way	in	which	oppressed	agents	might	put	themselves	in	a	better	position	to	
connect	the	individual	to	the	structural	position	is	by	deliberating	and	exchanging	their	
experience	and	their	reasons	for	why	they	think	they	are	exceptional.	It	does	not	seem	
too	demanding	to	require	those	who	think	they	are	exceptional	to	compare	the	different	
sources	for	their	exceptionalism.	Indeed	since,	as	we	suggested	earlier,	these	sources	are	
likely	to	differ,	the	comparison	to	other	cases	might	help	agents	to	unveil	higher-order	
and	 more	 pervasive	 social	 rules	 to	 which	 both	 of	 their	 behavioural	 strategies	 react.	
Taking	up	the	responsibility	to	explain	and	express	just	why	one	thinks	one	is	exceptional	
and	 comparing	 one's	 experience	 with	 that	 of	 others	 might	 lead	 agents	 to	 discover	
common	 cause	 in	 reflecting	 on	 counterfactual	 possibilities	 about	 how	 each	 tends	 to	
operate	in	their	environment.	For	example,	our	female	academic	who	so	carefully	avoids	
wearing	particular	clothes	or	flirting	with	powerful	colleagues	will	wonder	why	it	is	she	
that	needs	to	make	the	extra	effort,	while	her	male	colleagues	do	not	need	to	navigate	
quite	so	carefully	in	the	same	work	environment.	Even	if	such	behaviour	comes	to	her	
quite	naturally	and	does	not	demand	much	of	an	extra	effort,	a	comparative	element	in	
reflecting	about	her	 future	experiences	will	be	 introduced	and	might	eventually	point	
towards	the	missing	link	between	the	individual	experience	and	the	structural	problem.	
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 agents	 who	 benefit	 from	 being	 successful	 in	 the	 system	 might	
                                                             
39	See	for	a	useful	related	discussion	that	also	underlines	the	social	dimension	of	morality	Cheshire	Calhoun,	
“Responsibility	and	Reproach”	Ethics,	99,	2	(1989):	389-40,	at	p.	396	ff.	
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understand	that	although	they	personally	avoid	the	negative	consequences	of	structural	
oppression	on	their	primary	action	environment,	other	members	of	 their	group	might	
not.	Through	a	mutual	confrontation	of	their	individual	experiences,	they	might	also	see	
that	 although	 they	 tend	 to	 ascribe	 their	 exceptional	 position	 to	 the	 possibility	 of	
identifying	margins	of	agency	while	playing	by	the	dominant	rules,	they	are	not	in	control	
of	the	rules	themselves	and	hence	lack	real	social	and	political	power.	Only	by	exchanging	
reasons	 and	 explanations	 for	 their	 exceptionalism,	 oppressed	 agents	 might	 come	 to	
observe	structural	reasons	for	their	position	and	hence	build	towards	a	more	open	public	
reflection	 with	 regard	 to	 it.	 And	 only	 then	 will	 they	 also	 come	 to	 understand	 that	
empowerment	means	not	to	play	by	the	rules	(even	when	one	individually	benefits)	but	
to	be	an	equal	contributor	to	their	making.	
Developing	strategies	of	collective	agency	and	change,	 targeting	the	underlying	
system	of	social	rules	is	not	an	easy	task.	Individuals	alone	seem	ill-equipped	to	transform	
the	way	structures	operate.	However,	to	understand	one’s	personal	position	in	relation	
to	these	is	a	first	and	necessary	step	for	doing	so.	Indeed,	only	then	and	only	after	the	
emergence	of	public	awareness	on	the	relevant	form	of	structural	constraints	can	agents	
be	in	a	position	to	question,	criticise,	deride	or	subvert	such	deficient	social	rules40	and	
only	then	can	one	engage	with	more	demanding	collective	responsibilities	for	political	
activism.	 In	 this	 sense,	 oppressed	 agents	who	 are	 in	 some	way	 exceptional	might	 be	
important	role	models	for	other	members	of	their	groups,	and	their	example	is	especially	
progressive	and	encouraging	when	they	have	obtained	some	degree	of	awareness	of	the	
different	 ways	 in	 which	 one	 can	 be	 implicated	 in	 structural	 injustice.	 For	 example,	
powerful	 female	 professors	 who	 “made	 it”	 are	 surely	 in	 a	 better	 position	 to	 raise	
awareness	 of	 unjust	 gender-norms	 than	 young	 scholars	 on	 short-term	 contracts.	 By	
enjoying	some	degree	of	respect	from	powerful	players	within	the	unjust	system	given	
their	record	of	success	within	it,	they	might	be	able	to	draw	strength	on	their	favourable	
position	as	individuals	to	reflect	on	the	(in)justice	of	the	structure	as	a	whole.	Likewise,	
immigrants	from	particularly	marginalised	groups	are	likely	to	play	an	important	role	if	
they	 obtain	 access	 to	 positions	 of	 power,	 including	 political	 office.	 Here	 individual	
experiences	 far	 from	 serving	 as	 a	 counter-example	 to	 the	 pervasiveness	of	 structural	
                                                             
40	The	technique	of	irony	and	parody	as	means	of	resistance	to	dominant	social	norms	is	discussed	by	Judith	
Butler,	Gender	Trouble	(NY:	Routledge,	1990)	in	Chapter	3	and	in	her	The	Psychic	Life	of	Power:	Theories	in	
Subjection	(Standford,	CA:	Stanford	University	Press,	1997).	
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injustice,	 can	 help	 to	make	 issues	 of	 structural	 injustice	more	 visible	 and	 to	mobilise	
collective	forms	of	fighting	against	them.	In	all	these	cases,	once	we	see	the	process	of	
acquiring	further	epistemic	awareness	for	one's	position	as	distributed	along	different	
degrees,	 the	 responsibility	 of	 victims	 to	 remedy	 structural	 injustice	 is	 also	 easier	 to	
discharge.		
	
	
VII.	Further	clarifications	and	objections	
	
This	paper	sought	to	reflect	on	the	political	responsibilities	of	the	oppressed	in	a	way	that	
is	sensitive	to	what	we	called	epistemic	opacity	with	regard	to	one's	own	oppression.	The	
specific	 list	of	 responsibilities	we	discussed	 is	not	 supposed	 to	be	exhaustive;	 a	more	
comprehensive	account	requires	more	work	(both	normative	and	empirical)	to	identify	
relevant	kinds	of	structural	injustice	and	groups	that	are	affected	by	it	(an	issue	that	falls	
beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper).	The	political	responsibilities	we	discussed	are	therefore	
supposed	to	be	exemplary	rather	than	comprehensive.	Even	so,	one	might	wonder	what	
their	exact	nature	and	status	is:	how	do	they	relate	to	general	and	special	responsibilities?	
And	how	do	they	relate	to	duties	of	justice	and	to	general	moral	duties?		
	 Let	us	start	with	the	first	question.	As	we	emphasised	at	the	beginning	of	the	paper,	
we	 understand	 the	 responsibilities	 of	 the	 oppressed	 to	 be	 grounded	 on	 the	 special	
political	responsibility	that	everyone	implicated	in	the	reproduction	of	an	unjust	structure	
has	to	contribute	remedying	the	injustice	of	that	structure.	We	recognise	that	there	might	
be	 alternative	 ways	 to	 ground	 such	 responsibilities	 and	 that	 these	 alternatives	 are	
different	 from	 the	 political	 route	 which	 we	 have	 followed	 and	 which	 focuses	 on	 the	
structural	 and	 not	 necessarily	 intended	 or	 foreseeable	 upshots	 of	 one’s	 actions. 41	
However,	 once	 we	 assume	 the	 plausibility	 of	 the	 political	 route	 for	 grounding	
responsibilities,	 it	 is	 instructive	 to	 reflect	on	 the	exact	degree	of	 epistemic	awareness	
relevant	to	specifying	the	content	of	those	responsibilities.		Thus,	even	if	the	ground	for	
                                                             
41
 Given	our	insistence	on	political	responsibilities	that	fall	on	everyone	implicated	in	structural	injustice,	
it	follows	that	those	in	a	position	of	epistemic	opacity	are	in	some	way	culpably	ignorant	–	we	are	grateful	
to	one	of	the	referees	for	asking	us	to	make	this	point	explicit.	But	notice	that	 in	the	model	of	political	
responsibility	outlined	here	culpability	is	much	less	relevant	as	a	criterion	than	in	alternative	moral	models	
underlining	causal	factors	and	epistemic	oversight.		
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the	victims’	responsibilities	is	the	duty	that	falls	on	everyone	implicated	in	a	system	of	
structural	 injustice	 to	 do	 their	 part	 remedying	 it,	 the	 content	 of	 such	 responsibilities	
remains	 distinct	 from	 more	 general	 and	 forward-looking	 duties	 to	 abstain	 from	
contributing	 to	 structural	 injustice.	 It	 is	 also	 distinct	 from	 the	 special	 duties	 of	
beneficiaries	 or	 bystanders	who	 are	 not	 themselves	members	 of	 an	 oppressed	 social	
group.	However,	it	is	worth	emphasising	that	nothing	we	have	said	in	this	paper	denies	
that	those	other	types	of	duties	exist	and	are	very	important	and	stringent.	
This	takes	us	to	a	second	point.	Throughout	the	paper	we	have	been	referring	to	
“responsibilities”	 and	 not	 duties	precisely	 to	 avoid	 linking	 political	 responsibilities	 to	
very	 stringent	 demands	 that	 could	 be	 discharged	 at	 very	 high	 cost	 to	 the	 victims	 of	
structural	injustice.	While	duties	of	justice	are	often	taken	to	be	stringent,	enforceable	
and	determinate	duties,	it	is	clear	that	none	of	the	political	responsibilities	discussed	here	
are	 enforceable	 in	 a	 literal	 sense,	 and	 it	 is	 also	 clear	 that	 their	 content	 is	 relatively	
indeterminate.42	Nevertheless	given	their	grounding	in	practices	of	structural	injustice,	it	
seems	 plausible	 to	 argue	 that	 the	 responsibilities	 here	 described	 are	 motivated	 by	
considerations	of	justice.	Even	though	they	cannot	be	thought	of	as	duties	of	justice	in	a	
strict	sense,	both	their	genesis	and	content	relate	to	the	existence	of	special	contexts	of	
structural	injustice.	
It	 is	 also	 important	 to	 emphasise	 that	 the	 degree	 of	 epistemic	 opacity	 in	 the	
awareness	of	injustice	is	only	one	consideration	to	take	into	account	when	fully	specifying	
the	concrete	content	of	 the	responsibilities	of	 the	oppressed	with	regard	to	structural	
injustice.	 It	 is	 undeniable	 that	 this	 perspective	 must	 be	 complemented	 by	 other	
considerations,	 such	 as	 the	 likely	 costs	 of	 particular	 actions,	 the	 intersecting	 group-
memberships	of	a	particular	person,	other	conflicting	responsibilities	agents	might	face	
and	so	on.	Although	we	have	argued	that	the	oppressed	do	possess	a	significant	degree	
of	agency,	the	content	of	their	responsibilities	should	be	spelled	out	with	a	view	to	what	
kinds	 of	 reasonable	 costs	 can	 be	 expected	 of	 them.	 This	 requires	 sensitivity	 to	 the	
circumstances	in	which	agents	act.	Taking	up	the	responsibility	to	resist	racism	through	
collective	political	organization	would	have	had	immense	costs	in	the	ante-bellum	South	
of	the	USA	whereas	discharging	such	responsibility	in	contemporary	America	might	still	
be	very	 costly	but	 to	a	 lesser	degree.	This	 clarification	might	help	deflect	 some	of	 the	
                                                             
42	Hay,	“The	Obligation	to	Resist	Oppression”	on	p.	28	ff.	
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objections	concerning	the	demandingness	of	 the	responsibilities	of	 the	oppressed	that	
we	examined	earlier	on.	
	
	
VIII.	Conclusion	
	
In	 this	 paper,	 we	 assumed	 that	 agents	 who	 are	 structurally	 oppressed	 have	
responsibilities	 to	 oppose	 their	 oppression,	 but	 we	 have	 argued	 that	 these	
responsibilities	need	to	be	differentiated	according	to	the	degrees	of	awareness	those	
agents	have	with	regard	to	structural	injustice.	We	suggested	to	distinguish	three	kinds	
of	 “epistemic	 opacity”:	 full	 epistemic	 opacity,	 partial	 epistemic	 opacity	 and	
exceptionalism.	In	the	case	of	full	epistemic	opacity,	it	seems	difficult	to	ascribe	political	
responsibilities	 above	 the	 responsibility	 to	 voice	 one’s	 dissatisfaction	 with	 single	
instances	of	apparent	injustices.	On	the	other	hand,	we	argued	that	agents	in	conditions	
of	 partial	 epistemic	 opacity	 and	 agents	who	 feel	 exceptional	 in	 not	 being	 affected	 by	
structural	 injustices	 may	 have	 stronger	 responsibilities.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 agents	 in	
conditions	of	partial	epistemic	opacity,	we	suggested	responsibilities	of	reflection	on	the	
sources	of	the	accepted	injustice,	aimed	at	helping	such	agents	identify	a	pattern	behind	
individual	 cases	 and	 contributing	 to	 rendering	 concealed	 rules	 explicit.	 In	 the	 case	of	
exceptionalism	we	suggested	responsibilities	that	encourage	agents	to	link	up	individual	
experiences	to	more	general	background	assumptions.	Particularly,	by	communicating	
and	 associating	 with	 others	 in	 a	 similar	 position	 but	 with	 different	 reasons	 for	
exceptionalism,	we	suggested	that	underlying	oppressive	rules	and	their	pervasiveness	
might	 become	 more	 visible.	 All	 this	 might	 further	 contribute	 to	 the	 development	 of	
collective	strategies	of	empowerment	and	change,	leading	to	potentially	more	demanding	
political	responsibilities	to	transform	the	current	oppressive	system.		
	
	
	
